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S1. EXAMPLES OF NON-ADMISSIBLE EXTENSIVE FORMS
WE ILLUSTRATE THAT THE CONDITIONS defining admissibility (no delegation, know your
action, and no partial commitments) are in a sense tight. In what follows, we present three
examples of extensive-form games, each of which satisfies two out of the three conditions
and a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these extensive forms that cannot be implemented
as an obedient perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the canonical extensive form. Since all
three examples feature |Θ| = 1, we omit the move by chance at the beginning of the tree.
S1.1. An Extensive Form That Fails ‘No Delegation’
EXAMPLE S1.1: Consider the following base game G, where N = {12}, Ai = {CD},





Consider the following extensive form . Edges labeled as actions represent moves that
determine that player’s action in the terminal history to be the one in the label.1
The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is illustrated in blue in
Figure S1, and it leads to {CC} being played with probability 1. This only depends on
ui(CC) > ui(DD) for i ∈ {12}.
Now consider the assumptions needed to sustain this outcome (i.e., both players co-
operate with probability 1) as an obedient Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the canonical
extensive form. Letting p denote the probability that player 1 moves first, the canonical
extensive form can implement {CC} with probability 1 only if p(u1(CC)−u1(DD))≥
(1 − p)(u1(DC) − u1(CC)), and (1 − p)(u2(CC) − u2(DD)) ≥ p(u2(DC) −
u2(CC)). These conditions are clearly stronger than ui(CC) > ui(DD) for i ∈ {12}.
Laura Doval: ldoval@caltech.edu
Jeffrey C. Ely: jeffely@northwestern.edu
1This example is based on Peters (2015).
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FIGURE S1.—An extensive form that satisfies know your action and no partial commitments.
S1.2. An Extensive Form That Fails ‘Know Your Own Action’











Consider the following extensive form illustrated in Figures S2 and S3.
Note that the extensive form in Figure S2 fails know your action: when player 1 chooses
move m1, he plays A if Nature moved left, and he plays B otherwise. Thus, move m1
determines player 1’s action; however, he does not know when he choosesm1 what action
he will be playing in the base game, G.
Figure S2 depicts in blue a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which player 1 chooses
m1, player 2 chooses D, and player 3 mixes with probability 05 between F and G. Off
path, when player 1 chooses A, player 2 chooses D, and player 3 chooses G.
Now consider implementing the above distribution over action profiles as an obedient
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the canonical extensive form. player 1 must receive with
positive probability a recommendation to play B, which he would never obey. In the ex-
tensive form in Figure S2, however, by choosing m1, it is as if player 1 could choose a
FIGURE S2.—Extensive-form game that satisfies no delegation and no partial commitments.
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FIGURE S3.—Subgame starting after moves a1 ∈ {AB}.
randomization between A and B—induced by the moves of player 3—that he himself is
not willing to carry out.
S1.3. An Extensive Form That Fails ‘No Partial Commitments’
EXAMPLE S1.3: The following example is based on Myerson (1986). Consider the fol-







Consider the following extensive form (illustrated in Figure S4) that satisfies no dele-
gation and know your action.
Figure S4 depicts in blue the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider implementing the induced distribution over action profiles as an obedient per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium of the canonical extensive form. This requires that player 1 is
recommended with positive probability to play B. This recommendation can never be
FIGURE S4.—Extensive form that satisfies no delegation and know your action.
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made obedient: by playing T , player 1 can make sure he obtains a payoff of 2, while con-
ditional on being recommended B, his payoff is 1.
S2. ILLUSTRATING BAYES’ RULE WHERE POSSIBLE
We will exhibit a conditional probability system for the example in Figure 6 to demon-
strate that the system of beliefs satisfies Bayes’ rule where possible.
In the extensive form, let Σi denote the set of pure strategies for player i, including
Nature. Nature’s pure strategy set Σ0 is {ad}, where a indicates the move “across” and d
indicates “down.” The equilibrium behavior strategy profileβ has the players playing pure

















) = 1 − q (S2)
for the “top-level” or unconditional probabilities of pure strategy profiles. Let Σ0 be the
support, that is,
Σ0 = Σ0 ×
{
σ∗1
} × {σ∗2 } × {σ∗3 }
Next, the formula βΣ(·) gives the conditional probabilities over pure-strategy profiles
at each node in the tree, as derived from the equilibrium behavioral strategy profile. We
specify that μ(· | y)= βΣ(y) for each node y in the tree.
Next, we define μ(· | Σ \Σ0). This is the conditional probability distribution over strat-







3 | Σ \Σ0







3 | Σ \Σ0
) = 1 − q (S4)
That is, the deviation was player 1 choosing X1. These are the only aspects of the condi-
tional probability system that matter for verifying Bayes’ rule where possible. We can thus
define the remaining conditional probabilities arbitrarily. (By Section S4, we can extend
μ to a fully specified conditional probability system.)
Now, to verify Bayes’ rule where possible, we must consider the beliefs at the two non-
singleton information sets. We will illustrate for the information set belonging to player 2;
the analogous argument applies to player 3. The system of beliefs assigns conditional
probabilities (0 q1 − q) to nodes e, f , and g, respectively, within player 2’s information
set.
Let Σe, Σf , and Σg be the (disjoint) sets of pure-strategy profiles with nodes e, f , and
g on their paths. Their union, call it h2, is the set of pure-strategy profiles having player













) = 1 − q (S7)
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Since Σe ⊂ h2 ⊂ Σ \Σ0, the chain rule for conditional probabilities implies
μ
(
Σe | Σ \Σ0) = μ(h2 | Σ \Σ0) ·μ(Σe | h2)
and since by previous construction we have μ(Σe | Σ\Σ0) and μ(h2 | Σ\Σ0) > 0, we obtain
μ(Σe | h2)= 0 as desired. Next,
μ
(
Σf | Σ \Σ0) = μ(h2 | Σ \Σ0) ·μ(Σf | h2)
Since Σf = {d}×{X1}×Σ2 ×Σ3, we have by Eq. (S3) that μ(Σf | Σ\Σ0)= q. Furthermore,
since Σ0 × {X1} × {σ∗2 } × {σ∗3 } ⊂ h2 and μ(Σ0 × {X1} × {σ∗2 } × {σ∗3 } | Σ \Σ0)= 1, it follows
that μ(h2 | Σ \Σ0)= 1 and thus μ(Σf | Σ \Σ0)= q as desired.
A similar calculation shows that μ(Σg | h2)= 1 − q.
S3. PURE STRATEGY AND NATURE MOVES FIRST
THEOREM S1: For any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (βν) of an admissible extensive form
, there is another admissible extensive form, ′, and a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (β′ ν′)
of ′, where players use pure strategies, which implements the same distribution over outcomes
as the original one did. Moreover, Nature moves only once at the beginning in ′.
S3.1. Notation
Let Σ = Σ0 × Σ1 × · · · × ΣN denote the strategy set. We use the notation Σ−0 ≡ Σ1 ×
· · · × ΣN to denote the players’ strategy set. Given a node y , let σi|y ⊆ Σi denote the
set of strategies of player i that coincide with σi at all nodes y ′ such that y ′ ⊀ y . Let
σ |y = ∏Ni=0σi|y .
A node y is on the path of strategy σ ∈ Σ if, for all nodes y ′ preceding y , we have that
(y ′σ(y ′)) weakly precedes y .
Given a node y , let Σj(y) denote the set of strategy profiles of j such that there exists
σ−j ∈ Σ−j for which y is on the path of (σjσ−j).
S3.2. Proof
Let (βν) denote a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of extensive form .
Let Σ∗ = Σ∗0 × Σ∗−0 denote the support of μ(·|Σ), where μ is the conditional probabil-
ity system associated with assessment, (βν). Kuhn’s theorem implies that μ(·|Σ) imple-
ments the same distribution over terminal nodes as β. In what follows, we label the set
Σ∗−0 = {σ−01    σ−0N} and say that σ < σ ′ for σσ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0 if the label of σ is less than
the label of σ ′.
Define a new extensive form ′ as follows. First, we construct the tree, V ′. The initial
move belongs to Nature where she chooses an element of Σ0 × Σ−0.2 After each such
move, we append a copy of the tree from , V . For every node y in the original tree, let
λσ(y) represent the node in ′ that corresponds to y when Nature chooses σ̃ ∈ Σ0 ×Σ−0.
Fix y ∈ V and σ ∈ Σ0 × Σ−0. Eliminate λσ(y) from the tree we just constructed if σ̃0 /∈
Σ0(y). Let V ′ denote the nodes that remain after this.
2Why isn’t this Σ∗0? In the original tree, players could have assigned positive probability to Nature deviating.
This may be important for incentives at some information set off the path of play. Now Nature will move first
so the only chance it has of deviating is at the root. So we cannot think of Nature just choosing from Σ∗0.
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REMARK S1: It is immediate to check that V ′ is a tree. Clearly, ∅ ∈ V ′. Moreover,
let y ∈ V ′ and let y ′ ≺ y . We show that y ′ ∈ V ′ as well. To see this, suppose first that
y = σ ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−0. Then, y ′ ≺ y ⇒ y ′ = ∅ ∈ V ′. Suppose then that y = λσ(y) for some
σ ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−0 and some y ∈ V such that σ0 ∈ Σ0(y). Then, y ′ ≺ y implies that y ′ = λσ(y ′)
for some y ′  y . Note that σ0 ∈ Σ0(y) implies that σ0 ∈ Σ0(y ′) . Thus, y ′ ∈ V ′. Hence, V ′ is
a tree.
Second, we construct information sets. Fix player i and an information set hi in the
original tree. For each σ∗i ∈ Σ∗i , there is a copy of hi, hi(σ∗i ), in the new tree formed by all
λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y) such that y ∈ hi and σ0 ∈ Σ0(y). We denote the strategy set in ′ as Σ′.
We specify Nature’s initial randomization as μ(· | Σ).
Define the obedient strategy σOi in 
′ as follows. For each i and σi ∈ Σ∗i , σOi (hi(σi))=
σi(hi). This implicitly defines a behavioral strategy profile βO such that for each i and
σi ∈ Σ∗i , βOi (hi(σi)) assigns probability 1 to σi(hi).
To construct the conditional probability system, μ′ (and the belief system, ν′), of the
assessment in ′, we now define a map between Σ and Σ′. First, let S ⊆ Σ be the set of
strategy profiles σ̃ ∈ Σ such that there exists y on the path of σ̃ and some σ−0 ∈ Σ∗−0 such
that σ̃ ∈ (σ̃0σ−0)|y . Let y
σ̃




σ−0 ∈ Σ∗−0 : σ̃ |yσ̃ ∈ (σ̃0σ−0)|yσ̃
}













if y = ∅
σ̃(y) if y ≺ y
σ̃
and σ = (σ̃0Σ∗−0(σ̃))
σO(y) otherwise
(S8)
Otherwise, if |Σ∗−0(σ̃)| > 1, let i denote the player on the move at yσ̃ . If there exist
σσ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃) such that σi = σ ′i , then let g(σ̃) denote the strategy in Σ′ constructed as
in equation (S8), except that g(σ̃)(∅) = (σ̃0σ) where σ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃) satisfies that σi <i σ ′i
for all σ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃). If no such σσ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃) exist, then let g(σ̃) denote the strategy in Σ′
constructed as in equation (S8), except that g(σ̃)(∅)= (σ̃0σ) where σ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃) satisfies
that σ < σ ′ for all σ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃).
We note for what follows that if |Σ∗−0(σ̃)| > 1, then μ(σ̃ |Σ) = 0. To see this, consider
two cases. First, if σ̃0 /∈ Σ∗0, the implication is immediate. Second, assume σ̃0 ∈ Σ∗0 and let
σσ ′ ∈ Σ∗−0(σ̃)σ = σ ′. Then, (σ̃0σ)|yσ̃ = (σ̃0σ ′)|yσ̃ . Clearly, it cannot be that yσ̃ is on
the path of either (σ̃0σ) or (σ̃0σ ′); otherwise, y
σ̃
= {∅} and this contradicts that σ = σ ′.
S3.2.1. Properties of g
We now make some observations about the properties of g−1(λσ(y)) for nodes y in the
tree V of .
To this end, given a node y ∈ V and σ = (σ0σ−0) ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−0, let s(σ y) denote the
following strategy in Σ. First, s(σ y) ∈ σ |y . Second, y is on the path of s(σ y). Third,
s0(σ y) = σ0. We note that S = ⋃(σ0σ−0)∈Σ0×Σ∗−0
⋃
y∈V {s(σ y)}. Moreover, it follows from
the definition of PBE that μ(s|y) > 0 implies that s = s(σ y) for some σ−0 ∈ Σ∗−0 and
some σ0 such that there exists σ∗0 ∈ Σ∗0 with σ0|y ∈ σ∗0 |y .
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LEMMA S1: g−1(λσ(y)) = ∅ ⇔ {s(σ y)} = g−1(λσ(y)). Moreover, if s(σ y) /∈
g−1(λσ(y)), then there exists σ ′−0 ∈ Σ∗−0 such that (σ0σ ′−0)|y = (σ0σ−0)|y and either
1. s(σ y) ∈ (σ0σ ′−0)|ys(σy) = (σ0σ−0)|ys(σy) ,3 or
2. (σ0σ−0)|y
s(σy)
= (σ0σ ′−0)|ys(σy) and either σ ′i <i σi or σ ′ <σ .
In both cases, σ ′−0 satisfies that s(σ0σ
′
−0 y) = s(σ0σ−0 y). Hence, s(σ0σ−0 y) =
s(σ0σ
′
−0 y) ∈ g−1(λ(σ0σ ′−0)(y)).
Fix σ∗i ∈ Σ∗i and an information set for player i, hi ∈Hi. Suppose that there exist σ−i ∈
Σ0 ×Σ∗−{0i} and y ∈ hi such that g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y))= ∅. Lemma S1 implies that there exists
σ ′ ∈ Σ0 ×Σ∗−0 such that s(σ∗i  σ−i y) ∈ g−1(λσ ′(y)).
LEMMA S2: If σ ′i = σ∗i , then g−1(λ(σ∗i σ ′−i)(y)) = ∅ for all σ ′−i ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−{0i}. Otherwise,⋃
σ−i∈Σ0×Σ∗−{0i} g
−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y)) = ∅.
PROOF: Note that perfect recall implies that player i makes the same choices on the
way to node y on s(σ∗i  σ̃−i y) for any choice of σ̃−i ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−{0i}. Now, s(σ∗i  σ−i y) =
s(σ ′ y) implies that (σ∗i  σ−i) and σ
′ coincide for nodes y ′ ⊀ y; in particular, σ∗i
and σ ′i coincide on nodes y
′ ⊀ y . Now, if y
s(σ ′y)
≺ y , then s(σ ′ y) ∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i σ ′−i)(y))
and s(σ∗i  σ−i y) /∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(v)) imply that there is a node such that yi ≺ y , ι(yi) = i
and s(σ∗i  σ−i y)(yi) = σ ′(yi) = (σ∗i  σ−i)(yi). Hence, for all σ̃−i ∈ Σ0 × Σ∗−{0i},
s(σ∗i  σ̃−i y)(yi)= σ ′i (yi). It then follows that for all σ̃−i, s(σ∗i  σ̃−i y) /∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i σ̃−i)(y)).
Now, suppose that y
s(σ ′y)
= y; then |Σ∗−0(s(σ ′ y))| > 1 and since σ∗i = σ ′i , we must
have σ ′i <i σ
∗
i . Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists σ̂−i such that
g−1(λ(σ∗i  ˆσ−i)(y)) = ∅, so that by Lemma S1, s(σ∗i  σ̂−i y) ∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i  ˆσ−i)(y)). Note that
s(σ ′i  σ̂−i y) = s(σ∗i  σ̂−i y) ∈ Σ∗−0(s(σ∗i  σ̂−i y)). Since σ ′i < σ∗i , this contradicts
s(σ∗i  σ̂−i y) ∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i  ˆσ−i)(y)).
Assume now that σ ′i = σ∗i . Then, λσ ′(y) = λ(σ∗i σ ′−i)(y) ∈ hi(σ∗i ) and g−1(λ(σ∗i σ ′−i)(y)) =∅. Q.E.D.
The former two observations imply that for all players i and information sets hi ∈
Hi in the original tree, there exists σ∗i ∈ Σ∗i such that g−1(hi(σ∗i )) = ∅. Moreover, if
g−1(hi(σ∗i )) = ∅, then every s such that μ(s|hi) > 0 is such that s ∈ g−1(hi(σ∗i )).
LEMMA S3: Fix player i, information set hi, and σ∗i such that g
−1(hi(σ∗i ))= ∅. Then, for
all information sets h′i in the original tree such that hi ≺ h′i, then g−1(h′i(σ∗i ))= ∅.
PROOF: Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists y ′ ∈ h′i and σ−i ∈ Σ∗−{0i} such
that g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y
′)) = ∅. Then, s(σ∗i  σ−i y ′) ∈ g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y ′)). Let y be the unique
node in hi such that y ≺ y ′. Clearly, λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y) is on the path of g(s(σ∗i  σ−i y ′)). More-
over, s(σ∗i  σ−i y)|y′ = (σ∗i  σ−i)|y′ = s(σ∗i  σ−i y ′)|y′ .
Since g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y)) = ∅, then there exists σ ′ = (σ∗i  σ−i) such that s(σ ′ y) =
s(σ∗i  σ−i y) ∈ g−1(λσ ′(y)). Moreover, σ ′|v = (σ∗i  σ−i)|y . Thus, for every node ỹ such that
s(σ∗i  σ−i y
′)|ỹ ∈ (σ∗i  σ−i)|ỹ , we have that s(σ∗i  σ−i y ′)|ỹ ∈ σ ′|ỹ . Since g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y))= ∅
3This means that we have been following the path of (σ0σ ′−0) (at least from ys(σy) onwards), even though
the recommendation was to play (σ0σ−0).
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implies that either there is a node that precedes y such that (σ∗i  σ−i)|· = σ ′|· or no such
node exists and σ ′−0 < (σ
∗
i  σ−{0i}), then it cannot be that g
−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y
′)) = ∅. Q.E.D.
LEMMA S4: Fix player i, information set hi, node y ∈ hi, and σ∗i ∈ Σ∗i such that
g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y)) = ∅. Let s′ ∈ λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y) be such that g(s(σ∗i  σ−i y)) = s′. If there is a
player j and information set hj in  such that s′ ∈ hj(σ̃j) for some σ̃j ∈ Σ∗j , then
1. (σ∗i  σ−i)j = σ̃j , and
2. g−1(hj(σ̃j)) = ∅.
PROOF: Note that s′ ∈ hj(σ̃j) implies that there exists yj ∈ hj such that s′ ∈ λ(σ̃j σ−j )(yj).
Then, either λ(σ̃jσ−j )(yj) precedes λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y), or the opposite holds. In either case, it has
to be that (σ∗i  σ−i)j = σ̃j .
For the second part, note that s′ ∈ λ(σ̃jσ−j )(yj) and g−1(s′)= s(σ̃jσ−j y). By construc-
tion, yj is on the path of s(σ̃jσ−j y) so that if y ≺ yj , then g−1(λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y))= s(σ∗i  σ−i y)
implies that g−1(λ(σ̃j σ−j )(yj)) = ∅. Suppose then that yj ≺ y . Then, ys(σ∗i σ−iy)  yj and by
definition s(σ∗i  σ−i y)|ys(σ∗
i
σ−i y)
∈ (σ∗i  σ−i)|ys(σ∗
i
σ−iy)
. Hence, the result follows. Q.E.D.
S3.2.2. Conditional Probability System: Step 1
We begin by constructing a conditional probability system on Σ′g = {A′ ⊆ Σ′ : A′ ∩
g(S) = ∅}. Let
μg
(
B′|A′) = μ(g−1(B′ ∩ g(S))|g−1(A′ ∩ g(S)))
for A′ ∈ Σ′g. We now check that μg indeed defines a conditional probability system on
Σ′g. Take any A
′ ∈ Σ′g. It is immediate to show that μg(A′|A′) = 1 and μg(g(S)|A′) = 1.
Consider now a set A′ ∈ Σ′g and any sets B′C ′ ⊆A′ such that B′ ∩C ′ = ∅. We have
μg
(
B′ ∪C ′|A′) = μ(g−1((B′ ∪C ′) ∩ g(S))|g−1(A′ ∩ g(S)))
= μ(g−1((B′ ∩ g(S)) ∪ (C ′ ∩ g(S)))|g−1(A′ ∩ g(S)))
= μ(g−1(B′ ∩ g(S)) ∪ g−1(C ′ ∩ g(S))|g−1(A′ ∩ g(S)))




where the third equality uses the definition of g−1 and the fourth equality follows from μ
being a CPS and B′ ∩C ′ = ∅ implying that g−1(B′)∩ g−1(C ′)= ∅.
Moreover, note that the product rule is satisfied: letting A′ ⊆ B′ ⊆ C ′C ′ ∈ Σg, we have
μg
(
A′|C ′) = μ(g−1(A′ ∩ g(S))|g−1(C ′ ∩ g(S)))




where the second equality uses that μ is a conditional probability system and hence satis-
fies the product rule.
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The definition of μg ensures that we can write the following. For any σ∗i and hi in 























































































where the first equality uses the product rule for conditional probability systems, the sec-
ond equality uses the definition of μ, and the last equality uses the properties of g−1
discussed above. This guarantees that the obedient strategy profile satisfies sequential
rationality at hi(σ∗i ).
The conditional probability system μ′ in the new PBE coincides with μg on Σ′g. More-
over, beliefs at information sets h that satisfy h ∈ σ ′g are defined using μ′.
S3.2.3. Conditional Probability System: Step 2
Fix player i and suppose there exists an information set hi ∈Hi and σ∗i ∈ Σ∗i such that
g−1(hi(σ∗i ))= ∅. We know there exists σ ′i ∈ Σ∗i such that g−1(hi(σ ′i )) = ∅ (see Lemma S1
and Lemma S2). Moreover, for each y ∈ hi and s∗ ∈ λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y), there exists a strategy
profile s′ ∈ λ(σ ′i σ−i)(y) that coincides everywhere with s∗ except that, at the root, Nature
recommends (σ ′i  s
∗
−i(∅)) and player i plays s∗i (h̃i(σ∗i )) at each h̃i(σ ′i ). Let ησ∗i →σ ′i denote
the mapping from hi(σ∗i ) to hi(σ
′
i ) defined in this way.
Define then the conditional probability system μhi(σ∗i ) on 2
hi(σ
∗
i ) \ {∅} to be given by, for
any B′ ⊆A′ ⊆ hi(σ∗i ) such that ησ∗i →σ ′i (A′)∩ g(S) = ∅,
μhi(σ∗i )
(








In particular, this implies that μhi(σ∗i )(s
′|λ(σ∗i σ−i)(y)) = μg(ησ∗i →σ ′i (s′)|λ(σ ′i σ−i)(y)) and
μhi(σ∗i )(s
′|hi(σ∗i )) = μg(ησ∗i →σ ′i (s′)|hi(σ ′i )). Recalling that σ ′i satisfies that (σ∗i  σ−i)|y =
(σ ′i  σ−i)|y for all σ−i ∈ Σ0 ×Σ∗−{0i}, this (together with equation (S9)) implies that player i
finds it optimal to play σ∗i (hi) at hi(σ
∗
i ) under these beliefs.
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Moreover, it follows from Lemma S4 that if μhi(σ∗i )(s
′|hi(σ∗i )) > 0 and s′ ∈ hj(σ∗j ),
then g−1(hj(σ∗j )) = ∅.4 Thus, μhi(σ∗i ) does not place positive probability on {hj(σj) :
g−1(hj(σj))= ∅}. Hence the supports of μhj(σj) and μhi(σi) are disjoint for all σi ∈ Σ∗i  σj ∈
Σ∗j , whenever i = j.









whenever i = min{j : (jσjhj) ∈ C}.
Now fix i and order the elements of Σ∗i = {σi1    σiMi}. For any collection {(lhi) :









whenever l = min{l′ : (l′h′i) ∈C}.
Finally, for each l ∈ {1    Mi}, we need to specify μ′(·|⋃hi∈H̃i hi(σil)) for different
collections H̃i of information sets of player i such that g−1(hi(σil)) = ∅. It suffices to




i ⊀ hi. Towards this end, let E(hi) = {h′i ∈ Hi :
hi  h′i ∧ h′i  hi}. Note that if E(hi) ∩ E(h′i) = ∅, then hi ⊀ h′i h′i ⊀ hi. Label the sets
E1    ENi so that
⋃Ni
l=1El =Hi and El ∩Ej = ∅ if l = j. Then, for any l ∈ {1    Mi} and









whenever there exists h ∈ H̃i such that h ∈Ejhi ∈El and j < l.
Defining μ′ to coincide with μhi(σ∗i ) on hi(σ
∗
i ) : g−1(hi(σ∗i ))= ∅ completes the construc-
tion.
S4. EXTENDING A CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY SYSTEM
Suppose thatX1 andX2 are disjoint finite sets, μ̃(· | ·) is a conditional probability system
over X1, and ν is a probability measure satisfying ν(X2)= 1 and ν(x) > 0 for all x ∈X2.
We will construct a conditional probability system μ(· | ·) over the union X =X1 ∪X2
to satisfy
1. μ(· | C)= μ̃(· | C) for all C ⊂X1,
2. μ(B |X)= ν(B) for all B⊂X2.
We define, for all C ⊂X1,
μ(·|C)= μ̃(·|C)
4This does not say that s′ has positive probability under μg(|hj(σ∗j )); after all, if yj is the node in hj such
that s′ ∈ λσ∗i σ∗j ·(vj), then g−1(λσ∗i σ∗j ·(vj))= ∅.
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and for C ⊂X2, we define
μ(B | C)= ν(B ∩C)
ν(C)

Finally, for C such that C ∩X1C ∩X2 = ∅, we define
μ(B ∩X2 | C)= 0 (S11)
and
μ(B ∩X1 | C)= μ̃(B ∩X1|C ∩X1)
These define the probability measures μ(· | C) for any C ⊂X . We now verify that μ is a
conditional probability system.
It is immediate that μ(C | C)= 1 for all C ⊂X . Suppose A⊂ B⊂ C ⊂X . We require
μ(A | C)= μ(B | C)μ(A | B) (S12)
Equation (S12) holds by construction for C ⊂ X1 since μ̃ is a conditional probability
system over X1.
Suppose that C ⊂X2; then A⊂ B ⊂X2 and the product rule holds by definition since
we can use Bayes’ rule with ν(·).
Consider now C ∩X1C ∩X2 = ∅. If B⊂X1, then B⊂ C ∩X1 andA⊂X1 and we have
μ(A | B)= μ̃(A | B)
μ(B | C)= μ̃(B | C ∩X1)
Then,
μ(A | B)μ(B | C)= μ̃(A | B)μ̃(B | C ∩X1)= μ̃(A | C ∩X1)= μ(A | C)
where the second equality follows from the chain rule applied to μ̃ and the final one is by
definition of μ.
Suppose now that B⊂X2, so that B⊂ C ∩X2. Then, Eq. (S11) implies that μ(A | C)=
μ(B | C)= 0, so that Eq. (S12) holds automatically.
Finally, suppose that B ∩X1B ∩X2 = ∅. If A⊂X1, then A⊂ B ∩X1 ⊂ C ∩X1 and
μ(A | C)= μ̃(A | C ∩X1)
μ(A | B)= μ̃(A | B ∩X1)
μ(B | C)= μ̃(B ∩X1 | C ∩X1)
Since the chain rule holds for μ̃, we have that Eq. (S12) holds for μ.
On the other hand, if A ⊂ X2, we have that μ(A | C) = μ(A | B) = 0 and Eq. (S12)
holds automatically.
Finally, suppose that A∩X1A∩X2 = ∅. Then,
μ(A | C)= μ̃(A∩X1 | C ∩X1)
μ(A | B)= μ̃(A∩X1 | B ∩X1)
μ(B | C)= μ̃(B ∩X1 | C ∩X1)
Since the chain rule holds for μ̃, we have that Eq. (S12) holds for μ.
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S5. THEOREM 4: AUXILIARY LEMMA
Theorem 4 implicitly uses the following result:
LEMMA S5: Let  be an admissible extensive form. Let z ∈Z denote a terminal node and
γ(z)= (θz az) the outcome associated with it. Then, for each i ∈N , there is a node on that
path that is decisive for azi.
PROOF: Let | · | denote the length of a node in the extensive form. Let zN = arg max{|y| :
y ≺ z∧γA(y) = az} and recursively for l= 1    N−1, zN−l = arg max{|y| : y ≺ zN−(l−1)∧
γA(y) = γA(zN−(l−1))}. Since  is admissible, {y ∈ V : y ≺ z ∧ γA(y) = az} = ∅ since
γA(∅) =A and hence zN is well-defined. Moreover, admissibility implies that γA(zN) =
Aι(zN) × {az−ι(zN)}. By definition, az ∈ γ(zN)=
⋃
z′:zN≺z γA(z
′) and zN ≺ z ∈Z. Moreover,
suppose there is i j i = j such that γi(zN) = azi and γj(zN) = azj . Without loss of gen-
erality, let j = ι(zN). No delegation implies that for all m ∈M(zN), γj(zNm)= γj(zN) =
azj . In particular, if (zNm∗) z, then γj(zNm∗) = azj , a contradiction to the definition
of zN . Hence, no such j can exist. Then, for j = ι(zN), γj(zN)= {azj}. Finally, no partial
commitments implies that γι(zN)(vN)=Aι(zN).
Inductively, one can show that γA(zi) = ×Nj=iAι(zj) × ×k∈N\{ι(zi)ι(zN)}{azk} and
γι(zi)(zim
∗)= avι(zi) for (zim∗) z. Q.E.D.
S6. SELF-CONTAINED COORDINATED EQUILIBRIA CONSISTENT WITH A GIVEN PRIOR
For any given θ, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game in
which there is complete information that the state is θ. Let α̂ be the associated joint dis-
tribution of action profiles and consider the outcome (θ α̂), that is, with probability 1, the
state is θ and the joint distribution of action profiles is α̂. This is a coordinated equilib-
rium outcome. In particular, for each action profile a in the support of α̂, we construct a
plan in which the players move in an arbitrary order and each player i is recommended to
play ai independent of previous moves. We conduct a mixture in which θ has probability 1
and the probability of the plan associated with profile a is exactly the probability α̂ assigns
to a. Because α̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the θ-complete-information simultaneous move
game, the obedience constraints will be satisfied.
Indeed, this coordinated equilibrium is self-contained. The actions in the support of α̂
belong to C1 because they are part of a coordinated equilibrium. And since the plans used
in the coordinated equilibrium only recommended these same actions, they will never be
eliminated at any subsequent step of the procedure leading to C. Thus, for every θ, there
exists a self-contained coordinated equilibrium assigning probability 1 to θ.
By an appropriate mixing of these, for any marginal distribution over states π̄, we can
obtain a self-contained coordinated equilibrium whose marginal over states is π̄.5 We
can use this fact to modify the proof of Theorem 2 as follows. Let π be a self-contained
coordinated equilibrium with marginal over states equal to a given prior π̃. Let ψ be
defined as in the proof. It is ε-close to π. Take ψ̄ to be a self-contained coordinated
equilibrium whose marginal distribution over Θ is π̃ + (π̃ − margΘ ψ) (because π̃ has
full support, for ε small enough this vector belongs to the simplex), and consider the
self-contained coordinated equilibrium given by ψ̃ = 12ψ + 12 ψ̄. Its marginal over states
equals π̃. Finally, set = (1 − ε)π + εψ̃. The mixture  is a self-contained coordinated
5In particular, we can do this for π̃ the prior in the base game.
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equilibrium that is within ε distance of π and has marginal over states equal to π̃. For
every action ai ∈ Ci, it assigns positive probability to plans with ai on the obedient path
and thus the obedient strategy profile is a self-contained Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
().
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